Abstract
Introduction
Many protocols, including electronic payment protocols, are designed to work correctly in the presence of an adversary (also called a penetrator) that can prompt honest principals to engage in an unbounded number of concurrent instances of the protocol. Payment protocols should satisfy at least two kinds of correctness requirements: secrecy, which states that certain values are not obtained by the penetrator, and agreement, which states that a principal executes a certain action only if appropriate other principals previously executed corresponding other actions (e.g., a payment gateway approves a charge to customer C's account only if customer C previously authorized that charge).
Allowing an unbounded number of concurrent protocol instances makes the number of reachable states unbounded.
The case studies in, e.g., [13, 6, 19, 10, 171 show that statespace exploration of security protocols is feasible when small upper bounds are imposed on the size of messages and the number of protocol instances. In most of those case studies, the bounds are not rigorously justified, so the results do not prove correctness of the protocols. Rigorous automated verification of these protocols requires either symbolic state-space exploration algorithms that directly accommodate these infinite state spaces or theorems that reduce correctness of these protocols to finite-state problems.
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can be regarded as a thread that runs the program corresponding to one role of the protocol and then terminates. A central hypothesis of our reduction is the bounded support restriction (BSR), which states that in every history (i.e., every possible behavior) of the protocol, each regular strand depends on at most a given number of other regular strands.
Our notion of dependence, embodied in the definition of support, is a variant of Lamport's happened-before relation [ 151, modified to handle freshness of nonces appropriately. BSR is not easily checked by static analysis, so we propose to check it by state-space exploration, while checking the correctness requirements. With statically checkable restrictions alone, it seems difficult to find restrictions that are both strong enough to justify a reduction and weak enough to be satisfied by well-known protocols.
To check BSR by state-space exploration, we need a reduction for it. We prove: if a protocol satisfies its correctness requirements and BSR when appropriate bounds are imposed on the number of regular strands in a history, then the protocol also satisfies its correctness requirements and BSR without those bounds.
Most existing techniques for automated analysis of systems with unbounded numbers of concurrent processes, such as [9, 11, 2, 3, 141, are not applicable to payment protocols, because they assume the set of values (equivalently, the set of local states of each process) is independent of the number of processes, whereas payment protocols generate fresh values, so the set of values grows as the number of processes (strands) increases.
Roscoe and Broadfoot use data-independence techniques to bound the number of nonces needed for an attack [20] . Their result assumes that each trustworthy principal participates in at most a given number of protocol instances at a time. Our reduction does not require that assumption; indeed, our goal is to justify such assumptions. Lowe's reduction [ 161 has similar goals as our reduction and provides tighter bounds in its domain of applicability, but it does not handle agreement requirements and does not apply to the variants of SET and 1KP described in Section 2. I .
The reduction embodied in Theorems 2 and 3 handles secrecy and agreement requirements and applies to simplified versions of SET [21] and IKP [4] . It extends the reduction in [22] in several significant ways. The class of preserved properties is extended to allow protocol-specific secrecy properties (roughly, any non-cryptographic value can be designated as a secret) and to allow use of more general predicates to characterize the desired relationship between actions in agreement properties. The class of protocols is extended by allowing hash functions, allowing arbitrary nesting of hashing and encryption in protocol messages, and relaxing the restriction that the recipient of a message be able to recognize the entire structure of the message.' These extensions necessitate substantial changes to the statement and proof of Theorem 1. That theorem is the crux of the proof of our reduction: it provides a staticallycalculated bound on a "dynamic" quantity (i.e., a quantity defined by a maximum over all possible executions of the protocol); that quantity is the dependence width, defined in Section 4.
Our results implicitly describe a simulation relation between systems with bounded-size histories and systems with unbounded-size histories. It would be interesting to see whether similar results could be obtained more easily in a process-algebraic framework, such as Spi calculus [I].
Model of Protocols
We use the strand space model [24] , with minor modifications.
The set of primitive terms is Prim = Text U K e y , where Text is a set of values other than cryptographic keys, and Let d o m ( f ) denote the domain of a function f . A sequence is a function whose domain is a finite prefix of the natural numbers. Let len(o) denote the length of a se-'Session keys are not used in the examples in this paper, so we omitted them from the framework. They can be handled roughly as in [22] . A directed term is +t or -t, where t is a term. Positive and negative terms represent sending and receiving messages, respectively. We sometimes refer to directed terms as "terms" and treat them as terms, for instance as having sub terms.
A truce is a finite sequence of directed terms. Let Trace denote the set of traces.
A truce mapping is a function tr E dom(tr) + Trace, where dom( tr) is an arbitrary set whose elements are called
strands.
A node of tr is a pair ( s , i ) with s E dom(tr) and 0 5 i < len(tr(s)). Let Nt, denote the set of nodes of tr. We say that node ( s , i) is on strand s. Let nodest,(s) denote the set of nodes on strand s in tr. Let strand((s, i)) = s, index((s,i)) = i, and t e r m t r ( ( s , i ) ) = tr(s)(i).
The local dependence relation is: (sl,il) 3 (s2, i2) iff
A term t originates from a node ( s , i) in tr iff ( s , i) is positive, t is a subterm of termt,((s, i)), and t is'not a subterm of termt,((s,j)) for any j < i.
A term t uniquely originates from a node n in tr iff it originates from n in tr and not from any other node in tr.
Typically, nonces are uniquely-originated. This is the strand space way of expressing freshness.
For symbols subscripted by the trace mapping, we elide the subscript when the trace mapping is evident from context.
Roles, Protocols, and Penetrator
A role is a parameterized sequence of directed terms. Associated with each parameter is a type, i.e., a set of allowed terms. Some parameters with type Nonce may be designated as uniquely-originated; informally, this means that the value of that parameter must be uniquely-originated. Uniquely-originated parameters are designated by underlining in the parameter list. We require that for every role r , for every parameter z of r with type Nonce, x is uniquelyoriginated iff the first occurrence of z in T is in a positive term. Let r.z denote parameter z of role T . For example, R(m : Nonce) = ((+nc)) defines a role R with one uniquely-originated parameter nc with type Nonce.
A truce for role r is a prefix of a trace obtained by substituting for each parameter z of r a term in the type of z. A role r and a trace B for r uniquely determine A protocol II is a set of roles, together with a set II.Secret C ( T e x t \ ( N a m e U Nonce)) of terms that are "secrets" (i.e., terms that should not be revealed to the penetrator). Excluding names here implies that the penetrator knows all names. Specialized notions of secrecy are used for keys and nonces, as described in Section 2.5.
Note that a history may contain multiple traces for the same role with identical bindings for parameters that are not uniquely originated.
To reduce clutter, we sometimes use a history instead of a trace mapping as a subscript; e.g., for a history h = ( t r , + , role), we define N h = Ntr.
The set of predecessors of a node n in a history h is
Let Hist(II) denote the set of histories of a protocol II.
A set S of nodes is backwards-closed with respect to a binary relation R iff, for all nodes n1 and 712, if 722 E S and n1 Rn2, t h e n n l E S.
Given a history h of a protocol II, a set -S of nodes of h that is backward-closed with respect to 5 h can be regarded as a history, denoted nodesToHistF(S), in a natural way. 
Examples
Typically, Keyp = { k e y ( x , y ) E Key I x = P V y = P } U { p v t k e y ( P ) } U {pubkey(%) I x E N a m e } .
Consider a payment protocol IISET based closely on [5]
and reminiscent of SET [21] , including the use of a dual-
History
A history of protocol II is a tuple h = (tr, 'qg, role), where tr is a trace mapping, Tg is a binary relation on Nt,, and role E dom(tr) -+ (II U I I p ( K e y p ) ) such that 1. For all n l , n2 E Nt,, if n1 yg n2, then there exists t E Term such that termt,(nl) = +t and termtT(n2) = -t. This represents that n1 sends t , and n2 receives t .
2. For all n1 E Nt,, if t e r m t r ( n l ) is negative, then there rnsg exists exactly one n2 E Ntr such that n 2 + n1.
3. 5 h is acyclic and well-founded (i.e., does not have infinite descending chains), where 5 h is the reflexive and transitive closure of (yg U 9) . Note that 5; is a partial order, first defined by Lamport [ 1.51. and results (e.g., "approved"), respectively. Let Name,, Name,, and Name, be disjoint subsets of Name not con-
For all s E dom(tr), t r ( s ) is a trace for role(s). A regular strand is a strand s with role(s) E II. A penetratorstrand is a strand s with role(s) E I I p ( K e y p ) .
The roles of protocol &ET appear in Figure 1 , and
IIsET.Secret = 0, for reasons given below. We use let expressions to avoid repetition of large subterms. We allow Cust.m = P and G a t e m = P to model malicious merchants; similarly for malicious clients and gateways. There is no reason to allow the "me" variable of each role (namely, Cust.c, Mrch.m, and Gate.g) to equal P , because P's actions are modeled by penetrator strands.
Use of Hash(PayDesc) instead of the set of all hashes as the type for Mrch.hpd requires some justification, because a merchant cannot determine whether the hash received in hpd is the hash of a payment description or, say, a ciphertext. Attacks involving terms that are not of the expected type are called Q p e j a w attacks. Use of the types Hash(PayDesc) and Hash( Order) can be justified by results like those in [ 121, which show that type flaw attacks can be prevented by using type tags in the protocol implementation. Extending their results to accommodate hashing and to accommodate the slightly larger class of agreement properties introduced below is fairly straightforward.
As another example, consider a version of the 1 KP pro- Figure 2 , and IIIKp.Secret = AcctNumo.
h(pd) in ( ( -[ t r a n s l p~t ( c ) ' [ t r a n s l p u t ( m ) . b d } p u b ( g )
price
Derivability
Informally, a term t is derivable (by the pentrator) from a set S of nodes if the penetrator can compute t from term (S) and Keyp. A formal definition follows.
For a nonce g that uniquely originates in a history h, let origin,(g) denote the node from which g originates in h. (2) there exists a node n E with termt,! ( n ) = +t. This relation is equivalent to the derivability relation in I71 and can be computed using the approach in [ 7 ] .
T ) = {{+x)).
Correctness Requirements
We consider the following kinds of correctness requirements. For This requirement applies even if G a t e x = P, i.e., even if the customer is dishonest.* SET is designed to provide secrecy for order and payment descriptions. as defined above does not provide such secrecy, because, e.g., a customer strand with Cust.m = P can reveal an order description to the penetrator. This is why we take
IIsET.Secret = 0. To express secrecy of order descriptions from gateways, we use a variant in which merchants are assumed to be honest; specifically, IIgET differs from as follows: the type for Cust.m is Name,, and
IIgET.Secret = Order. Dishonest gateways are modeled by penetrator strands (the types of Cust.g and Mrch.g contain P ) , so if order descriptions are not known to the penetrator, then they are not known to dishonest gateways, so they are not known to honest gateways. Secrecy of payment descriptions from merchants can be expressed similarly. Requirements for 1KP can be expressed similarly; for details, see [23] . 1KP also has a nonce secrecy requirement: Cust.R, is secret unless Cust.g E { P } .
Support
Informally, a set S' of nodes of a history tr supports a set S of nodes of tr if S' 2 S and S' contains all of the regular nodes on which regular nodes in S depend. A formal definition follows.
For T E Term, the set of nonces that occur in T is nonces(T) = (9 E Nonce I 3t E T : g occurs in t } .
Let RN: denote the set of regular nodes in history h of protocol n.
A set St of nodes is a support for a set S of nodes in a history h of a protocol II i f I. Nh 2 St 2 S.
S' is backwards-closed with respect to 9.
3. For all negative nodes n in S', preds,(n) n S' n RNF t-F termh(n).
For all g E nonces(termh(S')) n D , where
D = uniqOrigReqrdF (Nh) \ uniqOrigReqrdt (S'), g
occurs in the clear in termh(originh(g)). (This condition ensures the compositionality property expressed in Lemma 2.)
For example, consider the following history of a generic payment protocol. Suppose sc,l, s,,~, and sg,l are customer, merchant, and gateway strands, respectively, that interact without interference from the penetrator. Let g be a nonce that uniquely originates on sm,l and is revealed to the penetrator (e.g., the value of Mrch.nm in &ET). The penetrator then behaves as a merchant, interacting with a customer strand S,J and a gateway strand sg,2, except that the penetrator uses g instead of a fresh nonce. A support for sc,2 or sg,2 need not contain nodes on sm,l or sc,l. In that sense, sc,2 and sg,2 do not depend on sm,1, even though the chain of messages that conveys g means that there is causal dependence between those nodes in the classical sense of Lamport [ 151. Informally, that classical dependence can be ignored here because the penetrator could generate a nonce g' and replace g with 9' in the terms of nodes on s , ,~ and sg,2. The careful treatment of unique origination in the definition of derivability allows such inessential classical dependencies to be ignored. The following lemma says that a support can be transformed into a history by adding penetrator nodes, without adding or changing regular nodes.
For a set S of nodes, let strand(S) = {strand(n) I n E S } . For a trace mapping tr, a strand s E dom(tr), and a set S of nodes of tr that is backwards-closed with respect to
3, S contains nodes on a prefix of t r ( s ) ; let prefixtr(s, S)
denote that prefix. A (Vs E dom(tr') \ strand(S') : role'(s) E 
I I p ( K e y p ) )
A roZe'(s) = role(s))
Proof h' is constructed by combining nodes in S with histories that witness the derivability of terms (as required by item 3 in the definition of support). For details, see [23] [23] . I 'Bolignano's version of the protocol omits g from trans and consequently violates the conjunct Mrch.9 = Gate.9 (in his presentation, this conjunct corresponds to st'.mcht.gateway = G in the second filter function on p. 12).
nOnceS are available to the Penetrator even if they are
Bounded Support Restriction
A strand count for a protocol II is a function from the roles of IT to the natural numbers. A set S of nodes has strand count f iff, for each role r , S contains nodes from exactly f ( r ) strands for r . If N h has strand count f , then we say that history h has strand count f. Let fl ( T ) = 1 for every role r . We define a partial ordering -&c on strand counts for a protocol; ~S C is simply the pointwise extension of the standard ordering on natural numbers.
A [22] can be used to compute a (small) support for a given set of nodes. The current bounds probably need to be decreased somewhat before this is feasible, e.g., by finding a tighter bound on the dependence width (see Section 4).
Dependence Width
Informally, the dependence width of a negative term ~( i ) , i) , II) . The concept of dependence width is used in the proof of Theorem 2 in Section 5 to bound the number of strands involved in a violation of BSR.
Let n be a negative node of a history h of a protocol II, and let t bc a subterm of termh(n). A revruling set for t at n in FL is a set S of positive regular nodes of tr such that S C preds,(n) and S I -; t.
For a set S of numbers, let min(S) and m a x ( S ) denote the minimum and maximum element of S , respectively. We define min(8) = 0 and max(8) = 0.
Nodes in R that are on the same strand as n are not counted in the revealing set min-size (and hence not in the dependence width), because in the proof of Theorem 2-specifically, in equation (5)-those nodes appear in supportFo (so) and hence are excluded from the index set of the rightmost union, and the dependence width is designed to bound the size of that index set.
Note that, if there are no revealing sets for t at n in h (i.e., t is not known to the penetrator at that point), then rvlSetMinSz(t, n, h ) = 0.
Let T be a role in a protocol n, and let i be the index of a negative term in T . The dependence width of ( T , i) in II is D W ( ( r , i ) , I I ) = max({rvlSetMinSz (termt,((s, i)), ( s , i ) , (tr,Yg, role) 
The dependence width of a protocol II is
The proof of Theorem 2, and therefore also the proof of Theorem 3, rely on an upper bound on the dependence width of the protocol. If the protocol might send terms then i + 1 terms are needed to reveal g to the penetrator.
Our long-term secrecy requirement prohibits such behavior. Secrec),-limited dependence width, abbreviated SL dependence width and denoted DWSL, is defined in the same way as dependence width, except that the maximum over histories is restricted to histories satisfying long-term secrecy.
Let II be a protocol, and let t be a term, possibly containing parameters. nSecreto(t, II) is a bound on the number of subterms of t that are not known to the pene- Proof: Consider a strand s for T in a history h for (2) R is a revealing set for t at ( s , i) in h } )
II. We consider each subterm tl of termh((s,i))
and show that each hash, ciphertext, and element
The number of such subterms is bounded by nSecret ( (r, i), II) . Other subterms contribute nothing.
The definition of dependence width implies that terms not derivable by the penetrator contribute nothing to the dependence width (because such terms have no revealing sets), so in computing the bound, we conservatively assume all subterms are derivable by the penetrator. Consider cases based on the type of t l . 
Reduction for BSR and Long-Term Secrecy
The following lemma says, roughly, that constructing a history h' from a support S' of a set S of nodes of a history h does not create new supports for S .
Lemma 3. Suppose SO supports S in a history h of a protocol II. Let h' be a history of II whose existence is implied by Lemma 1 applied to So. Suppose S1 supports S in history h' of II. Then S1 n RNF supports S in history h of n.
Proof The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3 in [22] . I For a protocol II, define a strand count ,B(II) by Proof The forward direction (+) of the "iff" is easy. For the reverse direction (e), we prove the contrapositive, i.e., we suppose there exists a history h of 11 that violates BSR or long-term secrecy, and we construct a history of II with strand count at most P(n) that violates the same property.
BSR and long-term secrecy are safety properties satisfied by histories with zero nodes, and 3, is well-founded, so there exists a ih-minimal node no such that 1. nodesToHist:(predsh(no)) satisfies BSR and long-2. nodesToHistE(predsh(no)) U {no} violates BSR or Let ho = nodesToHist:(preds,(no)).
Let SO = strand(n0) and io = index(n0). Note that in ho. SO " UnER\"odes*,o (so) suPPorth, (strand(n)).
ho satisfies BSR, so each of the supports in ( 5 ) has strand count at most f1, so S 1 has strand count at most p(n) (note that no is on so, so { n o } U supporth,(so) contributes at most f1 to the strand count of SI).
Lemma 2 implies that SI \{no} supports {(SO, io -1)) U R in h; thus, S 1 supports {no} in h. Lemma 1 implies that SI can be transformed into a history hl of II by adding penetrator nodes. Adding penetrator nodes does not affect the strand count, so hl has strand count at most ,B (II) . We show by contradiction that no also causes a violation of BSR in hl. Suppose no does not cause such a violation. Then there exists a support S' for {no} in hl with strand count at most f1. Lemma 3 implies that S' n RNfl is a support for {no} in h with strand count at most f l , a contradiction.
Suppose io = 0. The proof is similar to the case io > 0, except no does not depend on the non-existent node 
